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Abstract: This paper examines the feasibility of network governance in the context of the EU's
expansion in the Western Balkans. The EU is formally committed to promoting network gov-
ernance but the realities of enlargement require the creation of effective states, in other words
of the primacy of hierarchy over network. Networks are created in enlargement and reflect the
complexities of public policy but these networks do not represent, as yet, a significant shift of
power away from the state. Despite a normative preference for network governance, the polit-
ical reality of enlargement is that the EU seeks the creation of effective hierarchy.
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1. Introduction
Zielonka [1] argues EU governance is flawed because
it is dominated by a statist paradigm. The EU's response
to complexity  and heterogeneity  is  to  become even
more state-like [2,3] but the EU's complexity ('a poly-
centric  system of  government,  multiple  overlapping
jurisdictions, striking cultural and economic heterogen-
eity, fuzzy borders, and divided sovereignty' [1], p. vii)
makes this unrealisable. Zielonka concludes that the
EU should explicitly develop 'neo-medieval governance'
which would look something like network governance.
So, on the one hand, the EU appears suited to net-
work governance, (to which it is normatively commit-
ted), but enlargement pulls in the opposite direction,
towards hierarchical governance.
The trend in the study of governance is to declare
the  victory  of  networks  over  hierarchy.  This  paper
does not deny the significance of networks, rather it
challenges the propositions that networks are, first, a
new form of governance; second, that networks have
supplanted hierarchy; and third, networks diffuse power,
reducing the centrality of the state. My argument is
that networks (multi-level and horizontal) are an inev-
itable response to complexity, describe political reality,
and do not necessarily signal a shift in the distribution
of power. Enlargement, I argue, requires high capacity
and capability  states which points to an even more
complex,  differentiated  (and  divided)  EU  in  which
hierarchy dominates.
We have a puzzle: enlargement is hierarchical but
the EU has an expectation of network governance [4,5].
What does the coexistence of hierarchy and networks
mean for  the distribution of  power in  a  polity? En-
largement and policy complexity explain why networks
form, do they explain their operation? If enlargement
is dominated by hierarchy and if, from a path depend-
ency perspective, initial conditions are critical, does
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the emphasis on hierarchy undermine the EU's prefer-
ence for a more diffuse, responsive, and accountable
power structure? In enlargement,  hierarchy is  func-
tionally superior to networks and necessary because
of the national government's centrality in satisfying EU
conditionality;  government  therefore  mandates  ac-
tions and defines the nature of network interaction,
which takes place 'under the shadow of hierarchical
authority' ([6], pp. 40–41).
The first section addresses the governance revolu-
tion and the supposed victory of networks and this is
explored further in the second section with reference
to EU enlargement. It argues that so great is the gap
between the Western Balkan states and the EU it can
only be bridged by hierarchy. The third section argues
that hierarchy is inevitably the primary focus of en-
largement, paradoxically creating both networks and
concentrating power.
2. The Governance Revolution
The  rise  of  governance  was  predicated  on  the  as-
sumption that from the 1980s there was decline in
governing capacity ([7], p. 2, for example). Govern-
ing,  or  government,  refers  to  purposeful  actions  to
guide, steer, control  or manage using hierarchy and
the capacity and capability to adopt and enforce de-
cisions ([8], p. 551). Governance is the non-hierarchical
coordination of state-society interaction based on the
involvement of non-state actors in making and imple-
menting policy in which non-state actors enjoy consider-
able autonomy. The characteristic institution produced
by the (apparent) shift from government to governance
is the network, a concomitant of which is the 'rolling-
back' of the state [9,10]. 'Network' here refers to a
cluster of public and private actors in a policy sector
that  persists  over  time  and  whose  members'  make
and implement policy. The explosion of work on multi-
level and horizontal interaction has made 'network' into
a  common descriptor  of  the  EU and well  suited  to
understanding the EU's  consensual-bargaining policy
process ([11], pp. 3–13; [12], pp. 27–49; [13], pp. 53–54).
The growth of social complexity facilitated resistance
to central guidance, and networks developed to im-
prove  policy  and  limit  the  potential  for  resistance
([14], p. 20). Governance (and network) theory holds
that 'no single actor, public or private, has all know-
ledge and information required to solve complex, dy-
namic and diversified problems' ([7], p. 3). Policy and
politics are, however, always driven by public-private
interaction (when was a single actor ever totally dom-
inant?)  but  network  theory  stresses  not  interaction
but  interdependence of  such a degree that  govern-
ment is reduced to the status of just another actor
because of its reliance on non-governmental  actors.
Governability problems were stimulated by, and their
solution  required,  public  and  private  actor  engage-
ment in such complex ways that interaction becomes
interdependence,  but  the  hypothesised  shift  from
interaction to interdependence, assumes societal actors
possessed and exploited their resources and strategic
location to neutralise government. Therefore 'Reciprocity
and bargaining rather than hierarchy describes the way
the service delivery system functions' ([15], p. 380).
As a concept governance has several flaws, notably
it 'can be observed and experienced, but nobody can
in fact  do it' ([8], p. 550, original emphasis). Confu-
sion is increased by linking 'governance' and 'network'
to a degree that they become synonymous and the
literature  avoids  a  substantive  discussion  of  power,
focussing on power 'to' not power 'over'. Governance
embraces a vast field of interaction between non-state
actors  and  government,  becoming  a  near  catch-all
category.  The  problem  is  that  'control  deficits'  and
'implementation gaps' always exist and 'the only leak-
proof  system…is  where  the  instigator  and  executor
are one person'  ([15],  p.  362).  Control  deficits  and
implementation  gaps  create  and  sustain  space  for
hierarchy  ([8],  p.  551)  so  'empirically,  only  hybrid
forms may be found since one mode of governance
always  entails  elements  of  other  modes  of  gov-
ernance. Otherwise, effective steering and co-ordination
would not be possible' ([16], p. 3).
Hierarchy  and  network  co-exist  and  the  task  of
government is to facilitate and manage socio-political
interaction  in  different  policy  sectors  (which  may
require the government's withdrawal from, or interven-
tion in, a policy sector). Governments need knowledge
to  understand  problems,  identify  solutions,  allocate
and  define  responsibilities,  organise  implementation
and apply sanctions. Interaction is inevitable but need
not challenge power relations through the production
of interdependence. Governance as a concept is vul-
nerable to  'grandiose semantic  overstretch'  and can
justify both the extension and the substitution of the
state ([8], pp. 553, 556).
Networks possess resources that government values
but government has resources needed by networks,
resources  that  give  governments  important  advant-
ages.  Whether interaction becomes interdependence
depends on, first, the nature of resources; and second,
the degree to which supply is monopolised. Interac-
tion becomes interdependence when critical resources
are  controlled  by  a  few  actors;  interdependence  is
unlikely when there are many suppliers or if the supply
(and quality of the resource) is poor. Hierarchy's key
advantages are: authoritative and legitimate decision-
making, the coordination of complexity, and the ability
to create networks.
Coordination  needs  networks  of  separate  but
interacting organisations to amplify collective capabilities
and improve problem-solving. The central issue, there-
fore, is 'how does the central government coordinate
the fragmented system so that its policies are achieved'
([15], p. 364; see also [17], pp. 94–108)? Government
cannot  rely  on  self-regulation  or  self-organisation;
neither,  as  liberal  democracies,  can  they  routinely
employ coercion, which leaves interaction (especially
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in  the  hyper-compound EU polity)  usually  in  classic
Weberian-bureaucratic  ways.  Thus,  'central  govern-
ments are, in formal terms,  the principal  agents  for
major  allocations  to  an operating ideology since,  in
the last resort,  they can legislate for the necessary
change' ([15], p. 372, emphasis added). The EU com-
bines,  as  do  national  governments,  'old'  (hierarchy)
and 'new' (network) governance but the intergovern-
mental  nature  of  the  EU  (and  the  complexity  of
national  politics)  means  that  the  Commission  (and
national governments) 'steer' change and create, and
exploit networks. Enlargement creates policy networks
where  none  hitherto  existed,  or  changes  radically
existing networks.  Societal  actors can be viewed as
impediments or as assets but the Commission encour-
ages  the  formation  of  networks  ([18]).  Before  pro-
ceeding  we  must  distinguish  this  argument  from
external  governance.  External  governance  is  distin-
guished from enlargement by its lack of a membership
perspective, which reduces dramatically the incentives
for a country to bear the costs of adaptation (for ex-
ample, [19]). This paper focuses on a particular pro-
cess: the creation of the member state: 'a distinctive
kind  of  state  where  national  power  is  exercised  in
concert with others' ([20], p. 4).
How issues are resolved—hierarchy, markets, net-
work—can vary over time and by policy sector but in
all  cases  the  centre  dominates.  The  result  is  that
'government and governance…are actually much more
intertwined than is implied by some governance the-
orists' ([21], p. 484). This means that interaction need
not  become  interdependence.  The  Commission  and
enlargement states have a special interest in effective-
ness so governments—and therefore hierarchy—define
network dynamics. 'Not to put too fine a point on it',
Sharpe  concluded,  'government  is  not  just  another
organization' ([15], p. 381).
3. The EU Governance Puzzle and Enlargement
Under the Treaty on the European Union any European
(not defined) country may apply for membership if it
respects the democratic values of the EU and is com-
mitted  to  promoting  them.  The  1993  Copenhagen
European Council defined the accession criteria (the
Copenhagen criteria) thus: countries must have stable
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and respect for and protection of minor-
ities; a functioning market economy and the capacity
to cope with competition and market forces in the EU;
and the ability to take on and implement the obliga-
tions of membership, including adherence to the aims
of  political,  economic  and  monetary  union.  The
Copenhagen Criteria point clearly to a particular state
form. Accession is determined by the candidate's ad-
option, implementation and enforcement of all current
EU rules (the acquis) which are divided into thirty-five
policy chapters, whose content is not negotiable. The
Commission monitors, gives advice and guidance, as
well as assuring current members that conditionality is
being applied. This process is clearly directed at creat-
ing a particular state but also ensuring its effective-
ness.  Effectiveness  is  essentially  a  state's  ability  to
formulate and implement policies, in cooperation with
society, in pursuit of collective goals. Does the EU en-
gage in state-building?
The  EU  does  not  have  a  single,  coherent  state-
building  strategy  in  the  Western  Balkans  but  does
have a range of policies and delivery mechanisms im-
plemented across a variety of countries which, when
taken in the round, seek the creation of functioning
liberal  democracies  capable  of  joining  the  EU  and
undertaking the obligations of membership. There is
now a fairly  extensive literature examining the EU's
role in the Western Balkans and the impact of condi-
tionality and the nature of state building [22-26]. In
their different ways these sources explore the trans-
formative effect of the conditionality inherent in en-
largement  and  a  realistic  prospect  of  membership,
and  their  consequences  for  state-building.  However,
the  reliance  on  conditionality  as  a  state-building
mechanism has been deemed 'largely ineffective' be-
cause of 'the lack of commitment of political elites to
EU integration and the persistence of status issues on
the policy agenda' ([27], p. 1783). This article, in con-
trast to Bieber's, is concerned not so much with the
causes of any ineffectiveness but with the broader is-
sue of the scale of the misfit between EU conceptions
of  the  state  and  what  exists  in  the  WB  (Western
Balkans). The EU emphasised creating effective hier-
archy by exploiting the opportunities offered by condi-
tionality. The EU's problem in the WB is the problem
of stateness but state-building is complex for the EU,
which raises questions about the effectiveness of con-
ditionality in stimulating change.
Bieber focuses on the  minimalist state defined as
'state structures which fall short of the set of functions
most  states  are  widely  expected to  carry  out  [but]
might be able to endure' ([27], p. 1784), and focusses
on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and the Union of
Serbia and Montenegro (which no long exists) whilst
ignoring the region's non-minimal states. The minim-
alist state does not capture the variety of state forms
or stages of development covered by enlargement in
the  region,  what  this  paper  refers  to  as  the  WB7
(Croatia,  Montenegro,  Macedonia,  Serbia,  Albania,
Kosovo,  Bosnia  and Herzegovina).  All,  both  minimal
and non-minimal states, are deeply engaged with the
EU through the enlargement process. EU state build-
ing, as defined by Bieber, is security driven and origin-
ally concerned with conflict prevention but it merges
into institution building, which assumes the existence
of a state already capable of delivering minimal func-
tions.  Institution building is,  therefore, part  of state
building but not identical with it as the latter concen-
trates on core institutions and sovereignty and is broader
and less tangible than the former. State and institution
building, as Bieber ([27], p. 1791) concedes, are located
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on a continuum and contained by an overarching pro-
cess, member state building, involving the creation of
not just effective states but states able to sustain the
obligations of membership. Central to both state and
institution  building  is  conditionality  but  this  leaves
open specifics and national variation. Statements such
as the Copenhagen Criteria do not resolve the prob-
lem of  effective transposition or preference change,
which limits the EU's transformative power, the sec-
ondary (or indirect) effects involving accommodating
(or creating) institutions to European ways and trig-
gers extensive social learning. Engagement with the EU
involves  extending  the  state's  scope  and  increasing
institutional capacity but this does not inevitably result in
greater decentralization; indeed, as we have seen, the
EU's preference is for decentralised governance but this
is a normative preference and far more important for
enlargement is effectiveness, which means hierarchy. In
other words, in enlargement is about creating hierarchy. 
The EU's objective is the creation of effective states
so  how can  we measure  variation  in  effectiveness?
Variation is estimated using two measures; data drawn
the World Bank Governance Indicators and the Free-
dom House measure of political  rights. Government
Effectiveness (GE), one of the six measures compris-
ing the Governance Indicators, estimates the 'effect-
iveness gap'. It captures 'perceptions of the quality of
public services, the quality of the civil service and the
degree of  its  independence from political  pressures,
the quality of policy formulation and implementation,
and the credibility of the government's commitment to
such policies' ([28], p. 4). I identify two main groups:
the Enlargement 12 (Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Slovenia,
Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Latvia, Hungary, Po-
land, Lithuania, Bulgaria (2007), Romania (2007)) and
the seven Western Balkan states and entities seeking
membership or, in Croatia's case, achieving it (Table 1
and Table 2). The first WGI (Worldwide Governance
Indicators) data is for 1996 and this is the base-line
for the (then) EU15 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom) and represents the 'target' for enlargement
states,  ratings  for  2011  provide  comparison.  The
measure is expressed in units of a standard normal
distribution, with a mean of zero, a standard deviation
of one, with a range between –2.5 to 2.5; higher val-
ues  corresponding  to  better  governance.  The  EEA
(European Economic Area) is omitted as already ap-
proximating the EU model, and Turkey, whose Islamic
culture poses a set of different issues.
This  narrowing  effectiveness  gap  indicates  some
convergence between the EU15 and the Enlargement
12 but the picture becomes more complicated when
the WB7 are included. It is difficult to identify a base-
line date for the WB7 (1996 is unrealistic as all were
in the throes of Yugoslavia's break-up or transition);
the signing of a Stabilisation and Association Agree-
ment (SAA) with the EU marking the start of a formal
interaction is  a  good starting point  but  these came
into operation at different times (2 in 2001, 1 in 2006,
3 in 2008) so 2004 is a convenient mid-point.
This  indicates  no  significant  convergence  (the
WB7/EU15 gap closed because of decline in the latter,
not  improvement  in  the  former)  and  considerable
variation in effectiveness. The 2011 data for the Enlarge-
ment  12 and WB7 suggests two groups: states (ex-
cluding Bulgaria and Romania but  including Croatia)
with  an average GE of  0.66 (Croatia's  is  0.60) and
those (including Bulgaria and Romania but  excluding
Croatia) with an average GE of 0.51, Bulgaria's and
Romania's scores are 0.49 and 0.48 respectively. The
GE for the EU15 is 1.46. A further level of complexity
is  the  variation  within the  EU  15:  in  2011  Finland
scored  2.25,  Italy  is  the  lowest  at  0.45  (Greece,
invariably presented as the EU's basket-case, is 0.48).
 The extension of democracy and political rights is,
as we have seen, a prerequisite for enlargement, so
how do the three groups of  compare (Table 3 and
Table 4)? Taking the EU 15 as the benchmark, the En-
largement 12 data shows change over time and this
group contains variations: Romania (1998, 2004, 2007
and 2011) with an index of 2.0, Slovakia (1998) 2.0,
Latvia (2011) 2.0, and Bulgaria (1998, 2011) with 2.0,
all are rated 'free'. The WB 7 are different (Table 4).
Croatia  shows  considerable  improvement  after
1998 and is on a par with the EU 15 and Serbia is fol-
lowing  a  similar  trajectory  but  the  remainder  are
defined as 'partly free', which suggests democratisa-
tion has some way to go. Enlargement requires the
combined development of democracy and hierarchy;
variation is inevitable and due to history, the nature of
the enlargement process, and the response of nation-
al elites to the pressures of adaptation.
Table 1. The effectiveness gap: The EU 15 and
the Enlargement 12.
1996 2004/07 2011
EU15* 1.64 1.69 1.46
Enlargement 12** 0.57 0.64 0.63
Difference 1.07 1.05 0.83
Notes: *EU15 = Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United King-
dom; **Enlargement 12 = Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Slov-
enia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Latvia, Hungary,
Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria (2007), Romania (2007).
Table 2. The effectiveness gap: The EU 15, the
Enlargement 12 and the WB7.
2004 2011
EU15 1.69 1.46
Enlargement 12 0.64 0.63
WB7* 0.52 0.52
Note: *WB7 = Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Ser-
bia, Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Table  3. The  Freedom House  Index  (Political
Rights): EU 15, Enlargement 12 and WB7.
1996 2004/07 2011 Rating
EU 15 1.0 1.0 1.0 Free
Enlarge-
ment 12 1.25 1.08 1.20 Free
WB 7 4.0 2.9 3.0 PartlyFree
Table  4. The  Freedom House  Index  (Political
Rights): The WB 7.
1998 2004 2007 2011
Albania 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0
Bosnia 5.0 4.0 3.0 4.0
Croatia 4.0 2.0 2.0 1.0
Kosovo -- -- -- 5.0
Macedonia 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Montenegro -- -- 3.0 3.0
Serbia -- -- 3.0 2.0
Key: 1.0–2.5 free: broad scope for  open political
competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties,
significant independent civil  life, and independent
media;  3.0–5.5  partly  free:  some  restrictions  on
political rights and civil liberties, often in a context
of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic strife, or civil
wars;  5.5–7.0  not  free:  basic  political  rights  are
absent  and  basic  civil  liberties  are  widely  and
systematically  denied.  From  2003  partly  free  =
3.0–5.5; not free 5.5–7.0. Source: [29].
Treib,  Bähr  and  Falkner  ([16],  pp.  3–4,  5–10,  15)
identify  three dimensions of  governance:  politics (de-
cision  making  is  divided  between  government  and
private actors), polity (institutions different from markets
and  hierarchies),  and  policy (a  mode  of  political
steering). Treib et al.  then combine  legal instruments
(legally binding statements versus soft law) and imple-
mentation (rigid versus flexible), which they describe as
'the most critical' features, to develop a four-fold typo-
logy of modes of governance. The most relevant mode
is framework regulation (binding legal instruments com-
bined with flexible implementation) which comes closest
to  capturing  enlargement  as  a  centrally  (European)
mandated process in which national governments are
responsible  for  implementation.  As  a  mode  of  gov-
ernance framework regulation indicates the primacy of
hierarchy coupled with networks (see also [30]).
A  core EU objective  in  enlargement is  to  reduce
variation between states by policy transfer and norm
diffusion.  Enlargement  places  states  under  massive
downwards pressure to adapt, creating the capacity
needed to satisfy the obligations of membership. This
is  hierarchy,  but  the  EU (theoretically)  favours  net-
work governance. Enlargement is driven by inter- and
trans-governmental  negotiations  to  ensure  compli-
ance;  enlargement  is  dominated  by  hierarchy  to
achieve  effectiveness.  'Network'  permeates  the  EU's
conception of 'good' governance (policy making and
implementation to open to publics, non-state organisa-
tions and civil society) utilising five principles—openness,
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence
([31], p. 18). The principles underpinning enlargement are
unchanged and constitute the bedrock of enlargement
since Europe's post-Cold War 'reunification'. These prin-
ciples are exactly that: principles. They offer no detailed
guidance and therefore,  the  task of  the  Commission,
other European institutions and, of course, the Member
States ([32], pp. 258–259). The devil is in the detail.
Commission officials insist the Western Balkan states
have a credible  membership perspective (dating from
the Zagreb Summit in 2000) but, with the exception of
Croatia,  accession  remains  a  distant  prospect.  The
accession process became longer,  more intensive and
intrusive  extending  into  'post-accession  conditionality'
([33]).  Enlargement  poses  complex  problems  for  EU
institutions and imposes great domestic strains; the EU,
in line with the provisions governing enlargement, em-
ploys conditionality, monitoring, and rule transfer to push
polities towards 'the European model' of market, liberal-
democratic states. The EU and Commission stress this is
not a coercive process; states are not obliged to under-
take these reforms but if they are not undertaken to the
satisfaction of the Commission membership will not be
forthcoming. The progressive tightening of the policing
of the enlargement process was the result of the Com-
mission's assessment of its experience in Central  and
Eastern Europe and a changing political and economic
environment. The Western Balkan countries pose prob-
lems that make the 'big bang' enlargement of 2004 look
straightforward.  The  general  attitude  of  enlargement
countries remains, irrespective of specific complaints and
grumbling about the length of the process, one of 'better
in than out'. Given the broad consensus that the EU is
'the only game in town', one can understand why a high
priority is accorded membership. Although the costs of
adaptation are high and the process long, and requires
surrendering  (or  pooling)  sovereignty,  membership  is
perceived to be in the national interest. 
To navigate enlargement, countries must possess suf-
ficient  personnel,  knowledge,  expertise,  to  implement
and coordinate complex tasks in state building and in-
tegration. EU preferences and the bulk of governance
theory sees the involvement (and neutralisation?) of so-
cietal groups as simple prudence as well as improving
effectiveness and compliance; improving a state's ability
to govern  through (Mann's [34] infrastructural  power)
rather than over society. This implies an enabling state,
a state 'steering not rowing' and interacting extensively
with non-state actors to exchange information, accumu-
late expertise, enhance trust and improve problem-solving
([35], pp. 76–77). However, accession states lack capacit-
ies and capabilities that, when combined with conditional-
ity,  increase state autonomy and shift the emphasis to
hierarchy. The default response is to assert hierarchy and
centralise  power.  Networks  develop  because  of  policy
complexity and downwards pressure from both the EU
and national governments; so the presence of networks
per se indicates neither network governance nor a diffu-
sion of power. Engagement with the EU empowers state
actors; the state is not as hollow as we think.
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4. The Inevitability of Hierarchy
The EU seldom refers directly to state building, prefer-
ring synonyms (for example, 'a well-functioning and stable
public administration', a 'neutral civil service', a 'politically
independent judiciary') to describe activities that consti-
tute, in effect, state-building. Basic statements on en-
largement, notably the Copenhagen Criteria (CEC 1993
[35]) and subsequent amplifications (for instance CEC
1997 [36] and CEC 1999 [37]) offer mainly principles.
Nonetheless, enlargement requires a country 'bring its
institutions,  management  strategy  and  administrative
and judicial systems up to Union standards and with a
view to implementing the acquis…' ([38], p. 7). Despite
lacking an institutional model the capacity and normative
elements inherent in enlargement stimulated the European
Administrative System (EAS) that does influence  directly
the contours of the state ([39], pp. 506–531).
A basic principle is  that national administration is
the responsibility of national government but the EU
'does  influence  how  Member  States  govern  them-
selves' ([40], p. 120). The EU shies away from any ex-
plicit reference to state-building for four reasons: first,
it  is  dealing with  sovereign states;  second,  it  lacks
resources  and  personnel;  third,  change  is  best  de-
signed  and  implemented  by  those  with  the  fullest
knowledge and understanding of local conditions; and
fourth, local ownership is essential to ensure change
is embedded and sustained. Over time, and despite
national variation, however, states have converged on
what  constitutes  'good'  governance.  This  consensus
embraced 'the rule of law, principles of reliability, pre-
dictability,  accountability  and  transparency,  but  also
technical and managerial competence, organisational
capacity and citizens' participation' ([41], p. 5). These
constitute  a  preferred  regime—the  market,  plural
liberal  democracy—and  the  extent  to  which  these
principles  were  accepted  and  embedded by  a  state
seeking  membership  testified  to  a  determination  to
create the state capabilities and capacities and quality
of democracy that characterise a member state.
Within the overall expectation that inputs and out-
puts are generated in a particular way ('obligation de
résultat') states,  whether members or  aspirant,  'are
free  to  set  up  their  public  administration  as  they
please, but it must operate in such a way as to ensure
that community tasks are effectively and properly ful-
filled to achieve policy outcomes which are set by the
Union' ([40], p. 121). The interconnectedness of the
effectiveness and democratic criteria 'meant establish-
ing new constitutional provisions transferring power to
elected  representatives,  laws  protecting  freedom  of
opinion and expression, the establishment of a multi-
party system and the possibility  for  the electorate to
replace those in power'  ([40],  p.  122).  This is  state-
building and a limited range of variations are acceptable.
To  avoid  having  to  engage  directly  with  state-
building,  which  is  politically  sensitive  with  imperial
overtones, the EU split state-building into two separ-
ate processes: democratisation and capacity building,
a  distinction  it  strove  to  maintain  in  the  2004  and
2007  enlargements  and  thereafter.  Democratisation
was a national and popularly driven process suppor-
ted, but not directed, by the EU ([42], p. 3) but capa-
city building required a more overt EU role because 'it
is necessary to focus as much on the candidates' ca-
pacity to implement and enforce the  acquis…' ([43],
p. 5). Combined these produced a particular type of
state which transited from central planning and polit-
ical  authoritarianism to markets and pluralism 'while
at the same time gearing themselves up to the soph-
isticated machinery of European integration' ([42], p. 5).
As  assessment  of  PHARE  (Poland  and  Hungary:
Assistance  for  Restructuring  their  Economies)  found
there was no evidence that the Commission had used
PHARE to push institutional change even though what
existed was 'ill-suited to manage the transition to, and
needs  of  democratic  market  economies,  or  the
accession process'. PHARE was extended to eight of
the 10 2004 enlargement states as well as Romania
and Bulgaria. It was replaced by ISPA (Instrument for
Structural Policies for Pre-Accession) and IPA (Instru-
ment for Pre-Accession Assistance). Institutions proved
resilient and resistant to change, they remained highly
politicised  and  often  ineffective  [44].  CEE  states
undertook a double-transition, WB states faced a triple
transition—marketisation,  democratisation  and  nation-
building—a  far  more  significant  challenge  for  them
and  the  EU.  Here  the  relationship  between  state-
building and European integration was far closer than
in CEE. 'For the first time', Rupnik writes, 'in its history
[the EU was] directly involved in assisting the creation
of its future member states', encouraging the creation
of  'Brussels-oriented  constitutions'  ([45],  p.  34).  In
2005 the Commission lauded the EU's  transformative
power in CEE but admitted 'the Western  Balkans is a
particular  challenge…Enlargement  policy  needs  to
demonstrate its power of transformation in a region
where states are weak and societies are divided' ([46],
p. 2). Enlargement 'requires the creation  of  a  legally
constituted state,  acting under  the  rule  of  law and
with the elimination of arbitrary use of public power. It
therefore presupposes a thorough transformation  of
the system of governance' ([40], p. 122). In the WB
'basic issues of state building, good governance, ad-
ministrative and judicial reform, rule of law including
the  fight  against  corruption  and  organised  crime,
reconciliation,  socio-economic  development,  are  key
reform priorities for the Western Balkans' ([47], p. 22). 
This can be illustrated by the resources expended
on institution building (Table 5) that buttress democratic
transition and marketisation by strengthening democratic
institutions, administrative and judicial capacity, and civil
society.  They  show  the  significance  attached  to
institution building by the EU as well as problems with
capacity  and  capability  that  indicate  serious
shortcomings with hierarchy.
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Table  5. Instrument  for  pre-accession:  Component  I  Transition  assistance  and  institution  building
(percentage of total IPA expenditure by country/year).
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
Albania 89.0 88.3 87.9 89.4 89.3 90.0 88.7 88.9
Bosnia 93.5 93.3 94.1 95.5 95.5 95.1 95.0 82.3
Croatia 35.1 31.0 30.1 25.6 25.4 25.6 18.6 27.3
Kosovo 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.2 97.3 97.3 95.7 98.3
Macedonia 71.1 58.5 48.1 40.2 30.0 28.2 23.8 42.8
Montenegro 87.2 86.1 84.9 88.9 87.3 46.7 14.4 70.7
Serbia 95.6 93.9 93.6 94.0 94.4 94.3 94.3 94.2
Average 81.6 78.7 76.9 75.9 62.0 68.1 61.5
Source: derived from data in [48].
Enlargement  entails  extensive  state-building  in
polities with a history of centralisation and weak civil
societies ([49], pp. 116–142), that, together with the
Commission's emphasis on creating an effective state,
prioritises  hierarchy  over  network.  The  state  is  not
being by-passed or transcended but changed and the
change  'increases  the  intervention  capacity  of  the
state by bringing non-state actors into the making and
implementation of public policy'  ([8],  p. 555). How-
ever, this interaction need not increase interdependence.
Treib, Bähr and Falkner, for example, argue 'there is no
mode of governance that includes either only public or
only private actors. It can only be stated that a certain
type of actor is predominant' ([16], p. 9, emphasis ad-
ded).  Combining  structure (who does  what),  process
(how it operates) and outcomes (what is produced) net-
works are an essential and universal component of gov-
ernance and all governance is obviously and necessarily
multilevel and complex and in the EU is dominated by
governments. In enlargement the Commission is an au-
thoritative allocator of value. The EU is governed through
networks but not by networks and governments act as
gatekeepers and authoritative decision-makers. Hierarchy
is dominant in enlargement and reinforced by condition-
ality. Hierarchy precedes network; the problem is how to
demonstrate this.
Engagement with the EU has stimulated extensive
rule adoption and institution building ([50]; see also
[51]) that can plausibly be described as state-building.
The study on which this paper draws explores the de-
velopment of policy networks as a result of engage-
ment with the EU and the frequency and intensity of
interaction  in  these  networks  using  Social  Network
Analysis (SNA) employing UCINET/Netdraw (see [52])
to penetrate politics, polity and policy ([53], pp. 26–
29). A combination of semi-structured interviews and
a structured questionnaire allowed us to explore how
policy  networks  emerged  and  developed  and  how
their members interacted; the analysis combines 'thick
description'  and  systematic  analysis  across  policies
and  countries.  The  study  covered  Greece  (a  long-
standing  EU  member),  Slovenia  (a  relatively  recent
member), Croatia (then on the verge of accession),
and Macedonia (still a long way from accession) and
examined three policy areas (cohesion, borders and
migration,  and  environmental  policy)  utilising  data
from  120  respondents.  This  produced  twelve  SNA
maps; this paper omits Greece, leaving 62 interviews
and nine SNA maps, far too many to be discussed in
depth  here.  All  were  recognisably  networks,  albeit
with varying architecture. However, this paper uses in-
sights drawn from the data to comment on the nature
of networks and their relationship to hierarchy.
The networks are composed of organisations con-
nected  to  each  other  in  a  relationship  intended  to
deliver policy in a fashion satisfactory to the EU. The
paper assumes that the specifics of each policy-based
network can be used to identify general  patterns of
resource exchange and dependence. SNA helps us un-
derstand which actors play a critical role in determin-
ing how problems are resolved, relationships managed
and to what extent (and which) goals are achieved.
Network theory is often used descriptively or  meta-
phorically [54,55]); in The European Union and South
East Europe [53] we were interested not just in the
actors  but  their  relationships.  The network  is  influ-
enced  by,  and  influences,  actors'  behaviour  and
norms,  and  whilst  SNA  takes  actors  seriously  it  is
primarily  concerned with relationships,  not actor  at-
tributes. Combining SNA and interview data enables
power  and  influence  to  be  explored  systematically,
locating networks  in  their  environment,  an  environ-
ment structured by the EU and national governments.
This produced an interesting result: the EU may not
be a highly visible participant in a network although
actors perceive it to be an influential, or even determ-
ining, influence on a network. SNA identifies networks
but what is the role of hierarchy?
First, the EU requires the transposition of the  ac-
quis and legislation  and the creation of  appropriate
institutions.  Both  the legislation  and the  institutions
flow directly from EU requirements and were put in
place as a result of action by national governments,
an  unequivocal  example  of  hierarchy.  Second,  the
centrality of hierarchy was reinforced by the domin-
ance  in  each  network  of  a  central  ministry  in  both
horizontal and vertical policy relationships. This is re-
inforced by shortages of capacities and capabilities at
different  tiers  of  government but  which  tend to  be
concentrated  at  the  centre  thereby  increasing  the
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centre's pull. Finally, NGO and citizen participation is
normatively good but, lacking resources and expert-
ise, they find their role is often restricted to providing
information and legitimacy for central actors and their
preferences. The cumulative effect is to reinforce hier-
archy, which contrasts with the EU's emphasis on net-
work governance. However, engagement with the EU
has created networks and citizen and NGO participa-
tion was widely perceived as valuable for good policy
and as an end in itself,  a  response flowing directly
from engagement with the EU. 
The acquis must be transposed, so there is a high-
level of downwards adjustment pressure, but many in-
terviewees regarded the inevitable changes in institu-
tions and norms as intrinsically worthwhile as part of
a wider modernisation, as well as necessary to obtain
membership. Allowing for sectoral and country differ-
ences we found three patterns: first, a 'core' (or 'stra-
tegic')  group  of  actors  within  the  networks,  central
was  the  responsible  sectoral  ministry;  second,  over
time network relations became increasingly complex
(more  members  at  more  levels)  and  more  intense
(scale of interaction). This was allied to a belief by
actors that 'pluralisation' per se offered the possibility
of better policy in terms of content, legitimacy, and
implementation. Third, there was no direct connection
between pluralisation and power diffusion. The centre
remained dominant; interaction did not become inter-
dependence. There is, therefore, a potential for a re-
duction  in  the  centre's  dominance  over  time  but  a
historical  institutionalist  perspective  as  well  as  the
need  to  bridge  the  capacity  gap  between  the  WB
states and the wider EU and achieve membership is
unlikely to reduce significantly hierarchy's dominance.
A  policy  network  is  an  arena  of  extended  and
intensive interaction and communication,  embodying
values so an important  aspect of  networks is  norm
transference and behavioural change. Time ([56], p.
259) is an important element of the process, creating
the opportunity for behavioural and attitude change.
This lengthy process is designed to establish an evolu-
tionary trajectory,  rather  than signalling arrival  at  a
destination. EU governance norms, preferences, and
policy, pass through a filter—the national government
—which  is  responsible  for  transposition  and  imple-
mentation, and the overall effect is to sustain central-
ised power and hierarchy. We conceptualised this as a
'capacity bargain' whose functional, political and ad-
ministrative dimensions constitute the cutting-edge of
Europeanization.  In  The European Union and South
East  Europe we  employed  the  capacity  bargain  to
explore  the  impact  and  implications  of  engagement
with the EU in policy networks with varying mixes of
resources and actors, but structured by the require-
ments of EU policy and demands of domestic imple-
mentation ([53], pp. 17–21). The capacity bargain is
not about 'filling' a state with capacity as if it were an
empty vessel; rather the  acquis and the 35 chapters
pose specific, sectoral issues of institutional creation
and adaptation. Capacity bargains, being sectoral, are
analogous  to  policy  networks  but  are  focussed  on
enlargement; they promote 'state-effectiveness' because
of EU membership requires the creation of an effective
state  ([57],  pp.  51–70).  We found no  instances  of
interviewees rejecting network governance (either on
grounds of principle or utility), we did find scepticism
about  the  suitability  and  feasibility  of  network  gov-
ernance because of policy complexity, a lack of resources
and expertise,  competing political  loyalties,  and  the
primacy of accession. Early patterns of engagement
and  resource  distribution  are  difficult  to  alter;  net-
works are 'hardened' power reflecting a set of rela-
tionship  and  rewards  and  are  resilient,  requiring  a
powerful  exogenous shock to stimulate change. Our
evidence is that the Commission will trade network for
hierarchy thereby reinforcing central  power. Engage-
ment  with the EU stimulates change in governance
(whether this is transformative is a matter of empirical
analysis), but towards hierarchy. 
The Commission retains maximum flexibility in negoti-
ations although strictly speaking chapter negotiations
are not 'negotiations' [58]. The annual Progress Reports'
purpose is to stimulate the creation of effective hier-
archy and the evolution of capacity and capability. The
networks created are new and are a site for socialisa-
tion bringing domestic and supranational actors together
in repeated dense interactions over time, so opening
up the possibility of preference change. EU engagement
creates novel domestic policy sectors and institutions
influenced by a distinct  ethos.  Though authoritative
the EU does not impose change, it expects domestic
actors  to interact  in  new ways reinforced by,  for  ex-
ample, Twinning and joint projects. Slowness and vague-
ness are intrinsic to the learning process that rests on
the creation of appropriate hierarchies mobilising and
coordinating relevant non-state and societal actors. 
Elites (and society) agree their futures lay in the
EU; there is a credible membership perspective and
adaptive pressures are at work. Compared to CEE, en-
largement is  now far  more individualised and much
more closely policed. The power asymmetry inherent
in enlargement is de facto coercive (unless an applic-
ant  follows EU prescriptions it  cannot  join)  and re-
quires  more  than  strategic  adaptation  involving  the
creation and evolution of networks (grounded on the
acquis  chapters) in which EU derived institutions and
norms, interact and link actors in new ways for new
purposes [59]. Even when laws were passed imple-
mentation could be delayed or even postponed be-
cause  the  administrative  structures were insufficient
or even lacking. Networks can be, therefore, 'hollow'.
General  progress can co-exist with sectoral variations,
with  embedded  weaknesses  in  capacities  persisting;
though eager to develop network governance transposi-
tion  via hierarchy took priority. The focus on effective-
ness  and  hierarchy  stimulated  multileveled-ness  but
horizontal networks and partnership working remained
underdeveloped.  Technical  knowledge  and  working
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methods were transferred by EU engagement but short-
ages of capability and capacity and the load inherent in
enlargement placed a premium on developing hierarchy.
Networks can significantly increase the capacity of
state actors without increasing the influence of non-
state actors. A huge policy load, high EU expectations
and limited capacity  dictates societal  involvement in
policy  development  and  implementation  but  the
state's pivotal role in enlargement limits the influence
of non-state actors who, in any case, often lack the
resources to  play the role  allotted by network gov-
ernance. Cooperation and interaction with  non-state
actors,  whilst  inevitable,  does  not  automatically re-
duce state  autonomy and,  given enlargement's  em-
phasis on effectiveness, the greater the capacity for
hierarchical  action,  the  lower  the  incentive  for  en-
gagement with resource constrained non-state actors.
The point is that turkeys do not vote for Christmas;
governments  involve  non-state  actors  to  the  extent
that their involvement enables the former to achieve
its  objectives,  notably  EU  membership.  Hierarchy/
network is not a binary choice because governments
seek to preserve their  autonomy and enhance their
ability to achieve their policy objectives. Network gov-
ernance is resource intensive and coordination is com-
plex so why move decisively away from hierarchy? A
good case can be made for building up central capa-
city  first.  The evidence in  The European Union and
South East Europe [53] showed governments were often
suspicious  of  non-state  actors,  regarding  them  as
'watchdogs', as sources of friction, not partners. Simil-
arly, while non-state actors need resources and part-
ners they too value their autonomy and fear capture
by the state. Network governance will not, therefore,
emerge quickly and certainly not during enlargement.
Though obviously not WB states Bulgaria and Ro-
mania  shows  the  limits  of  the  EU's  transformative
power and offer insights into the EU's likely approach
to the Western Balkans. After 2007 Romania and Bul-
garia were subject to the Cooperation and Verification
Mechanism (CVM) addressing serious shortcomings in
justice and home affairs, and corruption. In Bulgaria
CVM established six benchmarks (judicial independence,
accountability, transparency and efficiency; high-level
and public sector corruption; and combating organised
crime) on which the Commission was to report regu-
larly [60]. Important legislation was passed but stra-
tegic gaps remained and the political  will  to deliver
varied. The Commission identified a lack of direction
and uncertain domestic commitment, concluding ex-
ternal pressure remained essential, which raises ques-
tions  about  the  irreversibility  and  sustainability  of
change. In Romania's case four benchmarks (judicial
reform, judicial integrity, high-level, and public sector
corruption)  were  identified  [61].  The  Commission's
quinquennial review was scathing. A lack of progress
was  combined with  events  that  raised  serious  con-
cerns  about  the  political  elites'  commitment  to,  or
even understanding of, the rule of law. Romania, the
Commission argued, was not being asked to achieve
standards higher than those in other Member States
but to implement what it had already agreed. Imple-
mentation problems and the absence of a consistent
developmental  trajectory raised the possibility of re-
forms already in place being reversed; hence the need
for continued external pressure.
CVM was a response to the shortcomings of  the
2004 enlargement. First, there was a perception that
the  historical  significance  of  'the  return  to  Europe'
could not be permitted to fail, which suggested states
had been allowed to join the EU that were not ready
and there had been insufficient emphasis on the EU
driving  domestic  change.  Second,  Bulgaria  and  Ro-
mania testified to the limits of the Commission's trans-
formative power. Third, adaptation was a 'centre-led'
process  involving  passing  legislation,  drawing  up
strategy  documents,  securing  funds  and  spending
them, tasks that required the creation and develop-
ment of central capacity [62]. Change was driven by
(and  from)  the  centre  and  by  the  need  to  secure
Commission approval to ensure that the polity was set
on an evolutionary trajectory ending in membership.
So whilst enlargement and the Commission's role are
presented as transformative, noteworthy are the limits
to this external pressure. Uncertainty over accession,
domestic  counter-pressures  and  history  reduce  the
pressure to reform but so would a premature commit-
ment because once a country joins the incentives to
reform decline markedly. There is, furthermore, evid-
ence  of  'back-sliding'  in  public  sector  reform in  the
2004 membership states; SIGMA [63] found the pro-
cess of public administration reform slowed after mem-
bership  and  that  in  some  cases  there  had  been  a
regression to previous patterns of behaviour.
CVM led the Commission to re-think 'post-accession'
conditionality and the dangers of premature accession.
CVM is not being applied to Croatia. The Commission
prepares six-monthly progress reports covering judiciary,
fundamental rights, war crimes, corruption, and shipyard
privatisation.  The  October  2012  report  on  Croatia
identified five areas where increased effort was required
together with twelve more specific tasks ([64], p. 17).
There  was  no  explicit  treaty  reference  to  delaying
accession but the European Council is empowered to
'take  all  appropriate  measures'  in  the  event  of  any
adverse report, lifting these measures when its con-
cerns  have  been addressed  satisfactorily.  There  are
three 'safeguard clauses'  to deal  with any problems
encountered with Croatia as an EU member; a general
economic  safeguard  clause  (for  adjustment  diffi-
culties); a specific clause relating to the internal market;
and  a  specific  justice  and  home  affairs  clause,  plus
various transitional provisions. The safeguard clauses are
precautionary  and  probationary  and  allow  Member
States  to  impose  protective  measures  or  the  EU  to
suspend specific rights up to three years after accession
and continue as long as necessary.
Croatia's  accession  (the  most  rigorous  thus  far)
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has, as happened after previous enlargements, stimu-
lated a re-think.  Candidate states from now on  are
subject to the 'European Semester-lite',  supplemented
by specific interventions but 'the crucial point…is the
change in our approach to the Chapters 23 and 24
[that are] a fundamental instrument of the transform-
ation…they touch upon the basic principles on which
the EU founded' [65]. Chapters 23 and 24 are 'the
acquis of the acquis' and, Füle argued, would permeate
negotiations from the start to 'enable us to participate
in the full  transition to democracy during the whole
negotiation process…the goal for the EU is not to tick
the box of negotiated chapters…' [65].
The emphasis accorded to justice,  organised crime
and corruption, security, and fundamental rights shows
the change in enlargement's context and the EU's limits.
In addition to being fundamental issues these emphas-
ised the centrality of the reform of public administration
and the development of an effective, modern, 'European'
State. Public administration reform involved institutional
reform and transmitting and institutionalising values and
norms such as openness, accountability, and transpar-
ency.  This  is  apparent  in  the  negotiating  framework
(June 2012) for  Montenegro,  which was itself  a con-
sequence of the problems of the Bulgaria, Romania, and
Croatia accessions and difficulties anticipated with the
remaining enlargement states ([66], p. 2). 
Acquis  implementation  could  not  be  achieved
without  first  strengthening  capacity  and  asserting
hierarchy. Hence the EU's increasing focus on public
administration  [67],  a  synonym  for  state-building.
NGOs often noted a decline in their influence, being
actively  courted when legislation  and strategy were
being  developed  but  then  being  ignored.  This  was
partly a result of a lack of skills but mainly because of
the focus on creating an effective state and a feeling
that  networks  could  be  obstructive  ([53],  p.  201).
Institutions  have  been  created  and  modified  in  re-
sponse  to  EU  requirements;  this  has  stimulated
learning and extended involvement in  policy-making
downwards and outwards and actors believe involve-
ment will  influence the evolution of policy networks.
This is unlikely to lead to a shift from hierarchy to net-
work,  from interaction  to  interdependence,  because
the basic pressures are to create hierarchy.
5. Conclusions
In an increasingly complex, differentiated and divided
EU how is order to be created and maintained? Offe
suggests  the governance's  literature's  focus on net-
works  ignores  'questions  of  power,  distribution,  and
conflict'  ([8],  p.  558). Effective policy is  more likely
when made and implemented via hierarchy; govern-
ments remain authoritative, if not unfettered, decision
makers.  The  purported  shift  from hierarchy  to  net-
work assumes a marked decline in government effect-
iveness,  which  can  be  compensated  for  by  involving
societal actors in partnership with government, but this
increases complexity, reducing government effectiveness
further. This network paradox is complicated in enlarge-
ment.  National  governments  are  critical  because  only
states can join the EU and national administrations are
responsible for putting in place, under Commission mon-
itoring  and  guidance,  the  capacities  and  capabilities
needed to sustain the duties and obligations of member-
ship. Whether or not these actions satisfy the EU's re-
quirements is decided by the Commission. 
Enlargement and integration are state building, a
process whose direction is determined and aided by
the EU, reinforced by a national commitment to mem-
bership. A national government can be simultaneously
'weak'  but 'stronger'  than both sub-national govern-
ments and non-state actors. In enlargement hierarchy
is  functionally  superior  because  enlargement  is
primarily about creating an effective state, and net-
works enhance state effectiveness. 
Network  characteristics—multiple  actors,  resource
exchange,  and  negotiation  and  bargaining  and  the
associated values of openness, accountability, represent-
ativeness, participation—are easily identified. Networks
per se do not represent a significant move away from
hierarchy.  Any  mode  of  governance  will  be  hybrid
([16], p. 11). When networks are created, if the state
is the most significant actor, it is likely to remain so
diminishing  the  prospects  for  network  governance.
The  state  is  not  being  rolled-back  or  hollowed-out.
What we see is the state rolling-forward and filling-in.
This is reflected, in part, in the focus on Chapter 23
(judiciary, fundamental rights) and Chapter 24 (justice,
freedom and security) and why these chapters have
become 'the acquis of the acquis'. This points to the
enhancement of government which occurred because,
first,  domestic policy was often underdeveloped and
differed markedly from what the EU envisaged; and
second, change was unavoidable driven as it was by
enlargement.  States could  not hope to approximate
the  EU's  organisational  and  normative  preferences
without first creating the appropriate hierarchies.
Hierarchy is prior to network; satisfying the EU and
achieving membership requires, first and foremost, an
effective state, and an effective state rests on bureau-
cratic  and  administrative  competence  and  a  secure
(and known) legal framework. This means that net-
work governance cannot be realised during enlarge-
ment, nor can it substitute for an effective state. To
reiterate: enlargement is not concerned with creating
network governance but creating effective hierarchies.
The  situational  logic  of  enlargement  dictates  the
primacy of hierarchy and that networks are a func-
tional  response to  enlargement and  complexity  and
not a new form of governance.
Acknowledgments
The empirical and theoretical issues discussed in this pa-
per are explored further in [53]. My co-authors are not
responsible for my analysis or interpretation of the data.
192
References
1. Zielonka J. Europe as Empire. The Nature of the
Enlarged European Union. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press; 2006.
2. Barroso M. Europe as Solution: Facts and Myths.
SPEECH/11/1.  3  January  2013.  Brussels,  Belgium:
European Community; 2013.
3. Rehn  O.  Reforming  Europe,  beating  the  crisis.
SPEECH/15/12,  11  January  2013.  Brussels,  Belgium:
European Community; 2013.
4. Hix S. The Study of the European Union II: The
'new  governance'  agenda  and  its  rivals.  Journal  of
European Public Policy. 1998;5(1):38–65.
5. Wincott D. Looking Forward or Harking Back? The
Commission  and  the  Reform  of  Governance  in  the
European Union.  Journal  of  Common Market  Studies.
2001;39(5):897–911.
6. Scharpf FW. Games Real Actors Play: Positive and
Negative Coordination in Embedded Negotiations. Journal
of Theoretical Politics. 1994;6(1):27–53.
7. Kooiman J. Socio-Political Governance: Introduc-
tion. In: Kooiman J, editor. Modern Governance.  New
Government-Society  Interactions.  London,  UK:  Sage
Publications; 1993.
8. Offe C. Governance: An "Empty Signifier"? Con-
stellations. 2009;16(4):550-562.
9. Ansell  C.  Network  Institutionalism.  In:  Rhodes
RAW,  Binder  SA,  Rockman  BA,  editors.  The  Oxford
Handbook of  Political  Institutions.  Oxford,  UK: Oxford
University Press; 2006. pp. 75–89.
10. Enroth  H.  Policy  Network  Theory.  In:  Bevir  M,
editor. The Sage Handbook of Governance. London, UK:
Sage Publications; 2011. pp. 19–35.
11. Eising  R,  Kohler-Koch B.  Introduction:  Network
governance in the European Union. In: Kohler-Koch B,
Eising R, editors. The Transformation of Governance in
the European Union. London, UK: Routledge; 1999. pp.
3–12.
12. Kohler-Koch  B,  Rittberger  B.  The  "Governance
Turn" in EU Studies. Journal of Common Market Studies.
2006;44(1):27–49.
13. Börzel  TA.  Network:  Reified  Metaphor  or  Gov-
ernance Panacea? Public Administration. 2011;89(1):49–
63.
14. Mayntz R. Governing Failures and the Problem of
Governability:  Some  Comments  on  a  Theoretical
Paradigm. In: Kooiman J,  editor.  Modern Governance.
New  Government-Society  Interactions.  London,  UK:
Sage Publications; 1993. pp. 9–20.
15. Sharpe LJ.  Central  Coordination  and the  Policy
Network. Political Studies. 1985;33(4):361–381
16. Treib O, Bähr H, Falkner G. Modes of governance:
Towards a conceptual clarification. Journal of European
Public Policy. 2007;14(1):1–20.
17. Dreschler  W. The Re-Emergence of  "Weberian"
Public Administration after the Fall of New Public Man-
agement: The Central and Eastern European Perspect-
ive. Haldskultur. 2005;6:94–108.
18. Lenschow  A.  Environmental  Policy:  Contending
Dynamics of Policy Change. In: Wallace H, Pollack M,
and Young A,  editors.  Policy-Making in  the  European
Union.  6th  ed.  Oxford,  UK:  Oxford  University  Press;
2010. pp. 307–330.
19. Lavenex S, Schimmelfennig F. EU rules beyond
borders:  theorizing  external  governance  in  European
politics. Journal of European Public Policy. 2006;16(6):
791–812.
20. Bickerton C. European Integration. From Nation-
States to Member States. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press; 2013.
21. Jordan A, Würzel RKW, Zito A. The Rise of "New"
Policy Instruments in Comparative Perspective: Has Gov-
ernance Eclipsed Governance? Political Studies. 2005;53
(4):477–496.
22. Cohen JJ,  Lampe JR. Embracing Democracy  in
the Western Balkans. From Post-Conflict Struggles to-
ward European Integration. Baltimore, MD, USA: Johns
Hopkins University Press; 2011.
23. Trauner F.  The Europeanisation of  the Western
Balkans:  EU  justice  and  home affairs  in  Croatia  and
Macedonia. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press;
2011.
24. Fagan A. Europe's Balkan Dilemma. Path to Civil
Society or State-Building? London, UK: I.B. Tauris; 2012.
25. Noutcheva G. European Foreign Policy and the
Challenges of Balkan Accession Conditionality, Legitim-
acy  and  Compliance.  London,  UK:  UACES/Routledge;
2012.
26. Elbasani  A,  editor.  European  Integration  and
Transformation  in  the  Western  Balkans.  London,  UK:
Routledge; 2013.
27. Bieber  F.  Building  Impossible  States?  State-
Building Strategies and EU Membership in the Western
Balkans. Europe-Asia Studies. 2011;63(10):1783–1802.
28. Kaufmann D, Kraay A, Mastruzzi M. The World-
wide Governance Indicators. Methodology and Analytical
Issues. Policy Research Working Paper 5430. Washing-
ton, DC, USA: The World Bank; 2010.
29. Freedom House. The Freedom House Index of
Political Rights. Available from: www.freedomhouse.org
(accessed on 29 July 2013).
30. Nicolaides  P.  Microfoundations  of  Policy  Imple-
mentation.  Towards  European  Best  Practice.  London,
UK: Routledge; 2012.
31. Commission  of  the  European  Communities.
European Governance. A White Paper. COM(2001) 428
final, 25 July 2011. Brussels, Belgium: EU Commission;
2011.
32. Avery G. Uses of time in the EU's enlargement
process. Journal of European Public Policy. 2007;16(2):
256–269.
33. Gateva E. Post-Accession Conditionality. Support
Instrument or Continuous Pressure? Working Paper No.
18. The Transformative Power of Europe. Berlin, Ger-
many: Freie Universität; 2010.
34. Mann M. The Autonomous Power of the State: Its
Origins, Mechanisms and Results. Archives Européenes
193
de Sociologie. 1984;25(2):185–213.
35. Council of the European Union. European Council
Conclusions,  Copenhagen 21–22 June 1993.  Available
from:  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/p
df/cop_en.pdf (accessed on 10 June 2012).
36. Council of the European Union. European Council
Conclusions, Luxembourg, 12–13 December 1997. Avail-
able from:  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms
_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/032a0008.htm (accessed on
10 June 2012).
37. Council of the European Union. European Council
Conclusions, Helsinki, 10–11 December 1999. Available
from:  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_dat
a/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm (accessed  on  15
August 2012).
38. Commission of the European Communities. Guide
to the Main Administrative Structures Required for Im-
plementing the Acquis. Informal Working Document for
Guidance Only (updated May).  Brussels,  Belgium: DG
Enlargement; 2005. 
39. Olsen  JP.  Towards  a  European  Administrative
Space? Journal of European Public Policy. 2003;10(4):
506–531.
40. Fournier J. Governance and European Integration
—Reliable Public Administration.  SIGMA Paper no. 23.
Paris, France: OECD; 1998.
41. OECD. European Principles for Public Administra-
tion. SIGMA Paper no. 27. Paris, France: OECD; 1999.
42. Commission of the European Communities. En-
largement Strategy Paper; 2000. Available from: http://
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/rep
orts_2000_en.htm (accessed on 20 September 2012).
43. Commission of the European Communities. Mak-
ing a Success of  enlargement.  Strategy Paper;  2001.
Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archive
s/pdf/key_documents/2001/strategy_en.pdf (accessed on
23 September 2012).
44. OMAS Consortium. Assessment of the EU Phare
Programmes. Multi-Country Thematic Report on Public
Administration  Reform;  2001.  Available  from:  http://
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/phar
e/interim_s_zz_pad_01003_fv_en.pdf (accessed  on  23
October 2012).
45. Rupnik J. EU Enlargement in the Balkans: A Com-
parison with Central Europe. In: Accession of the West-
ern  Balkans  to  the  EU:  Evaluating  a  Process.  Paris,
France: Sciences Po; 2010.
46. Commission of the European Communities.  En-
largement Strategy Paper COM(2005) 561 final Brussels,
9 November 2005. Brussels, Belgium: EU Commission;
2005.
47. Commission of the European Communities. West-
ern Balkans: Enhancing the European Perspective COM
(2008) 127 final, 5 March 2008. Brussels, Belgium: EU
Commission; 2008.
48. Commission of the European Union. Enlargement.
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance. Available from:
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/overview/i
ndex_en.htm  (accessed on 2 September 2013).
49. Mazower M. The Balkans. From the End of Byzan-
tium to the Present Day. London, UK: Phoenix Press;
2000.
50. Renner S, Trauner F. Creeping EU-membership in
Southeast Europe: The Dynamics of EU Rule Transfer to
the Western Balkans. Journal of European Integration.
2009;31(4):449–465.
51. Trauner F. Deconstructing the EU's Routes of In-
fluence  in  justice  and  Home  Affairs  in  the  Western
Balkans. Journal of  European Integration. 2009;31(1):
65–82.
52. UCINET Software.  Available  from: www.analytic
tech.com/ucinet (accessed on 6 June 2009).
53. Taylor AJ, Geddes A, Lees C. The European Union
and South East Europe. The Dynamics and Europeaniza-
tion  and  Multilevel  Governance.  London,  UK:  UACES/
Routledge; 2012.
54. Wellman B. Structural Analysis: From Method to
Metaphor  to  Theory  and  Substance.  In:  Wellman  B,
Berkowitz SD, editors. Social Structures: A Network Ap-
proach.  Cambridge,  UK:  Cambridge  University  Press;
1988. pp. 19–61.
55. Dowding KH. Model or Metaphor? A Critical Re-
view of the Policy Network Approach. Political Studies.
1995;43(3):136–158.
56. Avery G. Uses of time in the EU's enlargement
process. Journal of European Public Policy. 2009;16(2):
256–269.
57. Geddes  A,  Taylor  AJ.  How  Capacity  Bargains
Strengthen  States:  Migration  and  Border  Security  in
South-East Europe. West European Politics. 2013;36(1):
51–70.
58. Confidential Interview. European Commission, 9
April 2009.
59. Taylor AJ. The Europeanization of Environmental
Policy: Institutional Creation and Evolution in Croatia and
Macedonia. Paper presented at the workshop "Environ-
mental Governance in Southeast Europe and the West-
ern Balkans: Reassessing the Transformative Power of
Europe",  8–9 February  2013, Berlin,  Germany.  Berlin,
Germany: Freie Universität; 2013.
60. Commission  of  the  European Communities.  On
Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verifica-
tion  Mechanism.  COM(2012)  411 final,  18 July  2012.
Brussels, Belgium: EU Commission; 2012.
61. Commission  of  the  European Communities.  On
Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verifica-
tion  Mechanism.  COM(2012)  410 final,  18 July  2012.
Brussels, Belgium: EU Commission; 2012.
62. Confidential Interview. European Commission, 31
March 2009.
63. Meyer-Sahling J-H. Sustainability of Civil Service
Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe Five Years after
EU Accession. SIGMA Paper no. 44. Paris, France: OECD;
2009.
64. Commission of the European Communities. Main
Findings  of  the  Comprehensive  Monitoring  Report  on
Croatia's  state  of  preparedness  for  EU  Membership.
COM(2012) 601 final, 10 October 2012. Brussels, Belgi-
194
um: EU Commission; 2012.
65. Füle  S.  Enlargement  brings  'positive'  news  in
times of crisis'. EurActiv, 13 August 2012; 2012. Avail-
able from: www.euractiv.com/enlargement (accessed on
15 October 2012).
66. Commission of the European Communities. En-
largement  Strategy  and  Main  Challenges  2012–2013.
COM(2012) 600 final, 10 October 2012. Brussels, Belgi-
um: EU Commission; 2012.
67. Elbasani A. EU Administrative Conditionality and
Domestic Downloading. The Limits of Europeanization in
Challenging  Contexts.  The  Transformative  Power  of
Europe Working Paper No. 2. Berlin, Germany: Freie Uni-
versität; 2009.
195
